Family Law and the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment by Momjian, Albert
Volume 25 Issue 4 Article 4 
1980 
Family Law and the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment 
Albert Momjian 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Albert Momjian, Family Law and the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment, 25 Vill. L. Rev. 677 (1980). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss4/4 
This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
FAMILY LAW AND THE PENNSYLVANIA
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
ALBERT MOMJIANI
I. INTRODUCTION
0 N MAY 18, 1971, THE VOTERS OF PENNSYLVANIA adopted an
equal rights amendment (ERA) to the Coin monwealth's consti-
tution which states: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged in the Conmonwealth of Pennsylvania because
of the sex of the individual." 1 In 1978, the Assembly gave the ERA
a legislative boost by enacting the Equalization Statute,2 a law de-
signed to eliminate any sexual discrimination apparent on the face of
the Commonwealth's existing statutes.3  This new law provides:
In recognition of the adoption of ... [the ERA], it is hereby de-
clared to be the intent of the General Assembly that where in any
statute heretofore enacted there is a designation restricted to a
single sex, the designation shall be deemed to refer to both sexes
unless the designation does not operate to deny or abridge equality
of rights under the law of this Commonwealth because of the sex of
the individual.4
The ERA and the Equalization Statute, together with the judicial
decisions interpreting them, have significantly affected the law of
support, 5 divorce, 6 custody, 7 and property rights, 8 as well as that of
many other family-related areas.9 This article will trace the de-
velopment of case law and legislative policy which together have de-
termined the impact of the ERA on family law.
II. SUPPORT
Following adoption of the ERA, change first came in the area of
support. Traditionally, the courts have viewed the man in his role as
husband and father as piimarily responsible for the support of the
I Senior Partner, Abrahams & Loewenstein, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. B.A. Columbia
College, 1955; LL.B., Columbia University School of Law, 1957. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
1. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28.
2. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
3. See notes 40-47, 86-87 & 142-50 and accompanying text infra.
4. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (Purdon Stpp. 1979).
5. See notes 10-58 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 59-102 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 103-17 and accompanyving text infra.
8. See notes 118-40 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 141-50 and accompanying text infra.
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family, 10 labeling this obligation "well nigh absolute."" In the area
of child support, for example, regardless of whether the mother had
substantial assets or earnings of her own, the support obligation was
placed squarely on the shoulders of the male parent.' 2 In the 1974
case of Conway v. Dana,13 however, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court applied the ERA to child support matters, holding that insofar
as previous decisions suggested a presumption that the male parent,
"solely on the basis of his sex without regard" for the actual cir-
cumstances of each party, was principally responsible for the financial
support of minor children, they could no longer be followed. 14  The
court called such a presumption a vestige of the past and "incompati-
ble with the present recognition of equality of the sexes." 15 Finding
support to be the equal responsibility of both parents, the court con-
cluded that the obligation must be discharged in accordance with
each party's capabilities. 16
While the Conway decision has had a significant impact on
Pennsylvania's support law, its application of the ERA has neither
imposed undue hardship on financially dependent women, 17 nor
caused calamitous deterioration of the family unit. 18 Indeed, the
courts have held that a parent may remain at home to nurture young
children, and that this nonfinancial contribution will be considered in
10. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Bortz v. Norris, 184 Pa. Super. Ct. 594, 596, 135 A.2d
771, 773 (1957); Commonwealth ex rel. Kreiner v. Scheidt, 183 Pa. Super. Ct. 277, 280, 131
A.2d 147, 148 (1957); Commonwealth ex rel. Silverman v. Silverman, 180 Pa. Super. Ct. 94,
98, 117 A.2d 801, 802 (1955).
11. Commonwealth ex rel. Firestone v. Firestone, 158 Pa. Super. Ct. 579, 581, 45 A.2d
923, 924 (1946). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Mickey v. Mickey, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 39, 42,
280 A.2d 417, 419 (1971); Commonwealth ex rel. Snively v. Snively, 206 Pa. Super. Ct. 278,
282, 212 A.2d 905, 907 (1963).
12. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Yeats v. Yeats, 168 Pa. Super. Ct. 550, 553, 79 A.2d
793, 795 (1951) (fact that mother has independent income is a circumstance to be considered
but does not bar compelling contribution from the father); Commonwealth ex rel. Firestone v.
Firestone, 158 Pa. Super. Ct. 579, 581, 45 A.2d 923, 924 (1946) (it is not a defense to father's
support obligation that custodial mother has independent means of support).
13. 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974). In Conway, appellant-father petitioned for a reduction
of his child support order on the grounds that his yearly income had markedly decreased, while
at the same time his former wife had obtained new employment. Id. at 537-38, 318 A.2d at 325.
14. Id. at 539, 318 A.2d at 326. The Conway court maintained that the state's primary
concern in promoting the best interests and welfare of the child would not be fostered by
preservation of the legal fiction that the father is necessarily the best provider. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 540, 318 A.2d at 326.
17. See notes 22-37 and accompanying text infra.
18. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text infra. For a statement of legislative intent em-
phasizing the Commonwealth's commitment to the family as a basic unit in society, see DI-
VORCE CODE, Act No. 1980-26, § 102, 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 50 [hereinafter cited as DIVORCE
CODE].
 VOL. 25: p. 677
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allocating child support obligations.19 In deciding whether a parent
will be required to contribute to the financial support of offspring and
thus, practically speaking, to seek employment outside the home, the
courts will balance several factors. 20  While the court will consider
and give significant weight to the parent's wish to remain at home,
the best interests of the child, and not the parent's wishes, will con-
,-O1.21
19. Commonwealth ex rel. Wasiolek v. Wasiolek, 251 Pa. Super. Ct. 108, 113, 380 A.2d
400, 403 (1977). In Wasiolek, an admittedly employable mother, who was seeking increased
support for her three children from their father, appealed an order from the lower.court requir-
ing her to contribute financially to the support obligation. Id. at 110, 380 A.2d at 400.
20. Id. at 113-14, 380 A.2d at 403. The factors to be considered include: the age and matur-
ity of the child; the availabilitv and adequacy of those who might assist the custodial parent; and
the adequacy of available financial resources if the custodial parent does remain at home. Id. at
114, 380 A.2d at 403.
The superior court has also held that "a wife, pursuing higher education which would give
her access to better employment opportunities, need not contribute to child support until that
education has been completed, even though she might have employable skills prior to comple-
tion." Commonwealth ex rel. Giamber v. Giamber, 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 111, 114, 386 A.2d 160,
162 (1978). In the final analysis, however, the persuasive factor is what best serves the child's
interests. See id.; note 21 and accompanying text infra.
21. Commonwealth ex rel. Wasiolek v. Wasiolek, 251 Pa. Super. Ct. at 114, 380 A.2d at
400. In an earlier case appealing a spousal support order entered against a husband during the
couple's separation period, the court considered the wife's earning capacity in determining the
fairness of the amount ordered where no children were involved. See White v. White, 226 Pa.
Super. Ct. 499, 504, 313 A.2d 776, 780 (1973). The White court, however, expressed in dictum
some reservation about applying a similar analysis of the wife's earning potential in cases where
young children are at home:
[T]here are strong moral reasons and public policy considerations why the law should not
by implication force a wife to seek employment when there are minor children at home.
A mother has a moral, if not a legal right to choose to remain home with minor children
and provide a home with the constant presence of a parental figure. The courts may not
interfere with the wish of the mother to give her children love and guidance. If the
mother chooses to work, however, our courts have held that earnings may be taken into
consideration in fixing the amount of a support order.
Id. at 504 n.4, 313 A.2d at 780 n.4 (emphasis in original).
Wasiolek, while adhering to the expressed commitment to the best interests of the child,
modified the White court's dictum by holding that, although the parent's assertion that the
child's interest is served by having a parent at home is "accorded significant weight," the court
is not strictly bound by such a contention. Commonwealth ex rel. Wasiolek v. Wasiolek, 251
Pa. Super. Ct. 108, 113-14, 380 A.2d 400, 403 (1977). Rather, Wasiolek held that a court should
balance the several factors outlined in note 20 supra, always keeping in mind the best interests
of the child. Id.
The Wasiolek court stated that allowing a nurturing parent to remain at home would not
violate the ERA, as long as the decision was made on sexually neutral grounds. ld. at 112-13,
380 A.2d at 402-03. Emphasizing this point, the court explained: "It would surely be ironic if by
its support order a court were to dictate that a parent desert a home where very young children
were present when the very purpose of the order is to guarantee the welfare of those same
children." Id. at 113, 380 A.2d at 403 (footnote omitted).
The argument of the parent wishing to remain at home becomes less persuasive, however,
as the child matures. Id. at 113 n.3, 380 A.2d at 403 n.3. See also Commonwealth ex rel.
Kaplan v. Kaplan, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 26, 30-31, 344 A.2d 578, 580-81 (1975). In Kaplan, a
working mother, who was seeking increased support from her 12-year-old child's father, had
turned down higher paying jobs which would have required her to work farther away from
home. Id. While granting some increase in support based on the father's increase in salary, the
3
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In equalizing child support responsibilities pursuant to the ERA,
courts do not, however, impute to a woman who has chosen the tra-
ditional role of homemaker, the same earning capacity as her husband
who may have more vocational skills and experience. 22  Rather, the
courts look realistically at all factors affecting her ability to contrib-
u te. 23
Pennsylvania's approach to spousal support parallels that in the
area of' child support, applying similar guidelines with some differ-
ences, however, in the underlying principles. 24 For example, in
White v. White,25 the superior court indicated that in spousal support
cases, on the issue of the employability of the spouse seeking sup-
port, consideration must be given to the amount of time the wife has
been out of work during the marriage.26 The court seemed to recog-
nize that a spouse who has been out of the job market for a consider-
able period of time may find it more difficult to obtain employment
than a spouse who terminated his or her employment shortly before
support proceedings or immediately after a separation. 27 Further,
the court noted that employability means more than just the availabil-
ity of work-i.e., it should take into account the relative skills 28 of
the spouse, the spouse's health and stamina, and the presence or ab-
sence of children in the home for whom the spouse as custodial par-
ent might have responsibility. 29  All of these factors should be consi-
dered and measured together with the duration of unemployment ex-
perienced by the spouse seeking support.30
court rejected the mother's assertion of the need to be near her child and, in figuring her
contribution, considered the higher salary she could he earning. Id.
2 2
. See, e.g., White v. White, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 499, 505 n.5, 313 A.2d 776, 780 n.5
(1973).
23. Id.
24. For a discussion of the new Divorce Code's approach to alinony and post-dissolution
property rights which are distinct from the support obligation, see notes 130-40 and accompany-
ing text infra. For a complete discussion of the new Divorce Code, see Gold-Bikin & Rounick,
The New Pennusylvania Divorce Code, Symposium: Recent Developments in Pennsylvania Family
Law, 25 VILL. L. Rlv. 617 (1980).
25. 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 499, 313 A.2d 776 (1973). In White, a husband, who allegedly de-
serted his wife, successfully challenged a support order. Id. at 504-06, 313 A.2d at 780. The
wife was voluntarily unemployed, and the couple had no dependent children. Id. at 500, 504,
313 A.2d at 778. The court found that an order requiring the husband to support his employ-
able wife filly was confiscatory, and that the support law was not intended to so penalize a
spouse or impose such confiscatory orders. Id. at 504-06, 313 A.2d at 780, citing Common-
wealth ex rel. Hainiowitz v. Haimowitz, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 364, 367, 292 A.2d 502, 504 (1972).
26. 226 Pa. at 505 n.5, 313 A.2d at 780 n.5.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 505, 313 A.2d at 780. For a discussion of the court's consideration of the contribu-
tion of a parent staying home with a child, see note 20 and accompanying text supra.
30. 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 499, 505 n.5, 313 A.2d 776, 780 n.5 (1973).
VOL. 2 : p. 677
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1980], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss4/4
PENNSYLVANIA FAMILY LAW
In child support cases especially, a court must determine the
mother's earnings or earning capacity. 31 If she has neither, the obli-
gation of support may continue to rest with the father. 32 If, how-
ever, the mother has earnings or earning capacity, the ERA mandates
that both parents contribute proportionally to the support of their
children. 33 However, the ERA clearly does not require parents with
unequal financial abilities to contribute on an equal basis. 34 Rather,
the amount of contribution will be based on the parents' respective
financial capacities. 35
Consider the situation where both the mother and father have
been divorced and their only child, who resides with the mother,
requires $5,000 per year for support. In determining the measure of
support which each parent should contribute, the court must consider
the relative earnings or earning capacities of the parents and their
respective personal needs. 36 In this illustration, assume that the
mother's net available income is $10,000 per year, and that the
father's net available income is $15,000 per year. If each parent
reasonably requires $10,000 per year for personal needs, the father
would have the sole obligation of supporting his child, notwithstand-
ing the ERA. It would be unreasonable to apportion the support obli-
gation solely on the ratio of the mother's net earnings to the father's
31. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 540, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (1974) ("best interest" of child
provided for by a consideration of both spouses' potential contributions).
32. In the traditional family structure, since the father generally assumes the role of "bread
winner," he will normally be obliged to provide support; however, where the father has no such
earning potential, he will be relieved of the support obligation. See Costello v. LeNoir, 462 Pa.
36, 41, 337 A.2d 866, 868 (1975) (father who was injured and on public assistance held finan-
cially unable to contribute to the support of his daughter).
33. See, e.g., Shapera v. Levitt, 260 Pa. Super. Ct. 447, 451, 394 A.2d 1011, 1013 (1978);
Commonwealth ex rel. Littman v. Littman, 260 Pa. Super. Ct. 97, 101, 393 A.2d 1030, 1032
(1978); Commonwealth ex rel. Lyle v. Lyle, 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 458, 462, 375 A.2d 187, 189
(1977).
34. See Costello v. LeNoir, 762 Pa. 36, 40, 337 A.2d 866, 868 (1975); Commonwealth ex
rel. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 26, 29-30, 344 A.2d 578, 580 (1975).
35. See cases cited note 34 supra.
36. The reasonable personal need of the parents is one consideration which may place a
ceiling on the amount of support which they can be expected to pay. While a parent is expected
to make some personal sacrifices in supporting the child, the amount of support must not be so
high as to be confiscatory or act as a penalty. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 538, 318 A.2d 324,
325 (1974); Shapera v. Levitt, 97 Pa. Super. Ct. 447, 451-52, 394 A.2d 1011, 1013 (1978).
While reasonable living expenses will be considered, the parent cannot maintain a high
standard of living when such is not enjoyed by his child. See Gitman v. Gitman, 428 Pa. 387,
394, 237 A.2d 181, 185 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 26,
30, 344 A.2d 578, 580 (1975); Hecht v. Hecht, 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 276, 283, 150 A.2d 139, 143
(1959); cf. Shapera v. Levitt, 260 Pa. Super. Ct. 447, 452, 394 A.2d 1011, 1014 (1978) (when
child is independently supported at a higher standard of living than the father could provide,
cost of this disparity in living standards should not be imposed on the father). See also Com-
ment, Calculation of Child Support in Pennsylvania, 81 DICK. L. REv. 793, 805 (1977).
1979-1980]
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net earnings without considering personal expenses, and the ERA
does not dictate such a result.3 7
The support provisions of Pennsylvania's new Divorce Code 38
apply much the same approach as that set out in the case law dis-
cussed above. In essence, the new law codifies the factors courts had
previously determined should be considered.3 9
Adoption of the ERA has also caused judicial reexamination of
statutorily created procedural rights in the area of support. For
example, in Commini wealth ex rel. Stein v. Stein, 40 a husband at-
tacked the constitutionality of the Act of 190741 which created an in
rei right to seize and sell a husband's or father's property in order to
satisfy a support judgment. 42  The statute, by its terms, created pro-
cedural rights for only the wife and the child. 43  Rather than nullify
the entire law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Stein, read its
provisions to allow reciprocal remedies for either spouse seeking to
enforce support orders. 44  The court found justification for this exten-
37. See Commonwealth ex rel. Berry v. Berry, 253 Pa. Super. Ct. 268, 272-73, 384 A.2d
1337, 1340 (1978). In Berry, the wife appealed the lower court's decision which had reduced
the husband's support payments based on a consideration of the parties' relative expenses. Id.
at 270-71, 384 A.2d at 1338. On the question of the comparative obligations of the parties, the
court stated:
It seems to be appellant's position that under the Equal Rights Amendment parents are to
be liable for support base(] strictly upon a comparison of their respective incomes rather
than their overall financial positions. Quite to the contrary, however, the amendment
demands that a court, in considering the proper support order to impose upon the pa-
rents, must assess each party's overall capacity to discharge his or her obligation of child
support.
Id. at 272-73, 384 A.2d at 1340.
For a discussion of the court's reasoning in considering expenses of the parent when assign-
ing support obligation, see note 36 and accompanying text supra.
38. DIVoiRcE CODE, supra note 18, §§ 501-507.
39. Id. The new Divorce Code sets forth criteria for determining alimony which include
most of the considerations examined in the support cases applying the ERA. For further discus-
sion of alimony under the new Code see notes 66, 76 & 135-40 and accompanying text infra.
For an analysis of the new Code's impact in general, see Gold-Bikin & Rounick, supra note 24.
40. 487 Pa. 1, 406 A.2d 1381 (1979).
41. Act of May 23, 1907, 1907 Pa. Laws 227, § 2 (current version at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48,
§ 132 (Purdon Supp. 1979)).
42. 487 Pa. at -, 406 A.2d at 1383. The Act of 1907 provided in pertinent part:
Whenever any man has heretofore separated, or hereafter shall separate, himself from his
wife or children, without reasonable cause, or whose whereabouts are unknown, and,
being of sufficient ability, has neglected or refused or shall neglect or refuse to provide
suitable maintenance for his said wife or children, proceedings may be had against any
property real or personal of said husband necessary for the suitable maintenance of the
said wife or children; and the court may direct a seizure and sale, or mortgage, of suffi-
cient of such estate as will provide the necessary funds for such maintenance; and service
upon the defendant shall be made as in other actions.
Act of May 23, 1907, 1907 Pa. Lsws 227, § 2 (current version at PA. STA'. ANN. tit. 48, § 132
(Purdon Supp. 1979)).
43. 487 Pa. at -, 406 A.2d at 1383.
44. Id. at -, 406 A.2d at 1387. The court noted that in considering the Act's constitu-
tionality, it was necessary to bear in mind the court's own authority "to make sensible and
[ OL. 2 : p. 677
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sion in the Equalization Statute 45 and in case law dealing with statu-
tory exclusions against specified classes.4 6  The supreme court, how-
ever, refused to consider whether such judicial extension would be
found constitutionally satisfactory if the discrimination were part of a
criminal statute.4 7
The superior court, on the other hand, has addressed the prob-
lem of arguably discriminatory criminal laws and the ERA, specifically
in the area of criminal nonsupport legislation .4  An example of one
such law which the superior court has considered is a Pennsylvania
statute which provides for a quasi-criminal support proceeding which
is available to children-and wives against husbands and fathers.4 9 De-
spite the fact that its benefits are available only to wives and children,
the statute withstood an ERA challenge brought by a husband prose-
cuted under it in Commonwealth ex rel. Lukens v. Lukens. 50  The
court justified its decision on the availability to husbands and fathers
of reciprocal civil support statutes. 51
practical adjustments in conforming current laws to the requirements of the constitutional man-
date." Id. at ., 406 A.2d at 1386.
45. Id. at , 406 A.2d at 1386-87, citing I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (Purdon Supp.
1979). Justice Nix, writing for the majority, noted that the Equalization Statute demonstrates
that the legislature does not favor nullification, but rather, prefers equalization of laws found
repugnant to the ERA. For the pertinent language of the Equalization Statute, see text accom-
panying note 4 supra.
46. 487 Pa. at -, 406 A.2d at 1386, citing Califano v. Westcott, 433 U.S. 76 (1979); Levy
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
47. 487 Pa. at -, 406 A.2d at 1386.
48. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4321 (1978) (willful separation or nonsupport is misdemeanor
of the third degree); id. § 4322 (support may be obtained by wife or children of man who
abandons family, with criminal enforcement mechanisms available after summary proceeding);
note 49 infra.
49. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4322 (1978). The statute provides, inter alia, that a wife or child,
deserted by a husband or father, may commence a quasi-criminal action through the district
attorney's office, have the husband or father arrested, and have him brought before the court
for a hearing. Id. The court may then issue a support order and imprison the husband or father
until he complies with the order. Id. The court may also issue a writ of execution against the
defendant's property. Id. The procedure is intended to provide a mechanism for the indigent
wife or child to petition for support without having to retain private counsel. See Gold-Bikin,
Support, in FAMILY LAw PRACTICE 126 (1979) (Pennsylvania Bar Institute Basic Legal Practice
Course).
50. 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 227, 229, 303 A.2d 522, 523 (1973). In Lukens, the husband ap-
pealed a $35 per week support order, issued under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4322 (1978), on the
ground that § 4322 violated the Pennsylvania ERA. 224 Pa. Super. Ct. at 229, 303 A.2d at 523.
51. 224 Pa. Super. Ct. at 229, 303 A.2d at 523. The court in Lukens referred to the Act of
June 24, 1937, 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1973 (repealed in part, 1976 Pa. Laws 993), which created
a civil remedy allowing the courts to order a husband, wife, child, father or mother of an
indigent person to provide support. 224 Pa. Super. Ct. at 229, 303 A.2d at 523. The court
considered this statute as the counterpart to the criminal statute in question and concluded:
"Since such a reciprocal arrangement exists under our support statutes, we hold that, while
there may not be mathematically precise equality, these statutes create a substantial right to,
support for both sexes. Therefore, they do not deny rights based on the impermissible classifica-
tion of the sex of the individual." Id. (emphasis in original).
7
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Whether such a decision is consistent with the spirit of the ERA
may certainly be questioned. Indeed, one member of the superior
court, Judge Spaeth, has suggested that Conway and certain United
States Supreme Court decisions have "depriv[ed] Lukens of much of
its force." 52
Another criminal statute provides a penal sanction for nonsup-
port.5 3 Under its provisions, a person is guilty of a misdemeanor of
the third degree if he deserts and does not support his wife and or
children, leaving them destitute and wholly dependent. 54 This law is
seldom used in family support cases and, thus, there has been little
judicial consideration of its constitutionality; 5 however, based upon
Judge Spaeth's observations, there would seem to be some question
as to whether it could withstand an ERA challenge. 56
It appears, then, that unlike what has occurred with respect to
the imposition of the support obligation in civil cases, in the area of
criminal and quasi-criminal nonsupport statutes, the effect of the ERA
is unclear. Cases such as Stein and Lukens offer little guidance as to
when courts will strike down a statute completely under the ERA, or
when they will apply the Equalization Statute and extend a law's pro-
visions. 57 Because of this uncertainty, the final determination of the
validity of such statutes is still very much open. However, such a
determination may be of only academic value, since the use of crimi-
nal proceedings in family law matters has fallen into general disfavor. 8
52. See Commonwealth v. Feingold, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 262, 266, 360 A.2d 692, 695 (1976)
(Spaeth, J., concurring and dissenting), citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Wein-
berger v.Weisenfield, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); and
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
53. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4321 (1978).
54. Id. § 4321(a). The statute provides that:
[a] person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree if he, being a husband or father,
separates himself from his wife or from his children or from wife and children, without
reasonable cause or willfully neglects to maintain his wife or children, such wife or chil-
dren being destitute, or being dependent wholly or in part on their earnings for adequate
support.
Id. A misdemeanor of the third degree carries a maximum prison.sentence of one year, see 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 1104(3) (1973), and a maximum fine of $2,500. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §
1101(5) (Purdon 1973 & Supp. 1980).
55. See Hess v. Hess, 71 D. & C.2d 299 (C.P. Allegheny 1974). In Hess, the court relied
on Lukens to uphold the constitutionality of § 4321, referring to the Lukens court's language
approving the whole Act of 1939. Id. at 301.
56. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
57. See notes 40-52 and accompanying text supra.
58. For example, the Pennsylvania Legislature recently repealed a statute which imposed a
criminal sanction for failure to support an illegitimate child and designated the offense a mis-
demeanor of.the third degree. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 9 4323 (1978) (repealed, 1978 Pa. Laws
106). The criminal statute was replaced by amending sections of the Pennsylvania Civil Pro-
cedural Support Law to include a duty to support children born out of wedlock. 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6701-6704 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
[VOL. 25: p. 677
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III. DIVORCE
Comparison of Pennsylvania's new Divorce Code 59 with the
statutory structure it replaced 60 dramatically demonstrates the impact
which the ERA has had on this area of family law. The new Code has
rendered moot many issues addressed in cases applying the ERA to
the law as it previously stood. 6' Nevertheless, that case law offers
sound guidance in interpreting and applying the new Code, since
many of its provisions may be understood as legislative responses to
those decisions. In addition, the ERA analysis of the prior case law
will still be instructive in deciding cases which arose prior to the new
Code's July 1, 1980 effective date. 62
Under the old divorce law, adoption of the ERA had its greatest
impact on three basic doctrines of Pennsylvania divorce law: alimony
pendente lite, 63 divorce from bed and board64 and selection of the
marital home. 65
A. Alimony Pendente Lite
While the 1980 Divorce Code makes alimony pendente lite avail-
able to both spouses, 66 the old law provided that this benefit was
available exclusively to the wife.6 7  In two post-ERA decisions,
Weigand v. ,Veigand 68 and Henderson v. Henderson,69 the superior
court considered the impact of the ERA on the old "wives only" law.
59. Dj VORCE CODE, supra note 18, §§ 101-802.
60. See "The Divorce Law," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1-69 (Purdon 1955 & Supp. 1980)
(repealed 1980).
61. See notes 66-102 and accompanying text infra.
62. DIVORCE CoDE, supra note 18, § 802.
63. See notes 66-76 and accompanying text infra.
64. See notes 77-89 and accompanying text infra
65. See notes 91-98 and accompanying text infra.
66. See DIVORCE COoE, supra note 18, § 502.
67. See Pub. L. No. 430, § 46, 1929 Pa. Laws 1237, as amended by Pub. L. No. 231, § 1,
1933 Pa. Laws 1020 (current version at DIVIRCE CODE, supra note 18, § 502). Under the old
code, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, and expenses were awarded to the wife during pro-
ceedings for absolute divorce or divorce from bed and board. Id. The provision was designed to
ensure that the wife had the financial ability to maintain or defend the divorce action. See Jack
v. Jack, 253 Pa. Super. Ct. 538, 543, 385 A.2d 469, 472 (1978). See also A. FuEEDMAN & M.
FREEDMAN, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DI'OIRCE IN PENNSYLVANIA § 428 (2d ed. 1957).
68. 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973), reversed, 461 Pa. 482, 337 A.2d 256
(1975). In Wiegand, a husband, ordered by the court to pay counsel fees for the divorce action
initiated by his wife, appealed the order on the grounds that the fees were excessive and that
the court did not allow him to question his ex-wife on disbursement of substantial sums previ-
ously paid to her. 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 280, 310 A.2d at 427. The superior court never reached
these questions but, rather, raised the question of the ERA sua sponte, finding that the law
which entitled women only to receive alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, and costs in a di-
vorce action was unconstitutional. Id. at 280-81, 310 A.2d at 427.
69. 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 182, 303 A.2d 843 (1973), reversed, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974).
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In Weigand, the superior court recognized that the statute grant-
ing alimony pendente lite only to the wife violated the ERA and,
thus, the court declared the law unconstitutional.70 The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court later reversed on procedural grounds, but in
reversing, the court did not question the superior court's constitu-
tional analysis.71 In Henderson, the supreme court expressly
acknowledged the existence of the constitutional conflict between the
"wives only" statute and the ERA to which the Weigand court had
reacted. 72 By then, however, the legislature had remedied the dis-
crimination with the passage of a law 73 that mooted the appeal before
the Henderson court. Nevertheless, the supreme court made clear
that it viewed the legislative action as a response to a patently uncon-
stitutional statute. 74  It appears certain, then, that had the legislature
failed to amend the statute to eliminate the bias against males, the
law would not have survived a constitutional challenge based on
Pennsylvania's ERA or, for that matter, on the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution. 75  Pennsylvania's new Divorce
Code reflects this precedent, incorporating the old act's amended
provision granting alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, and expenses
to either spouse. 76
70. 226 Pa. Super. Ct. at 286, 310 A.2d at 430.
71. See 461 Pa. 482, 484, 337 A.2d 256, 257-58 (1975). The court concluded, however, that
the issue of constitutionality was not properly before the superior court, for the question had.
never been raised or briefed by the parties. Id.
72. 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974). In Henderson, the supreme court considered the appeal
of a husband who had been ordered by the trial court to pay a security deposit for payment of.
costs in a pending divorce action. Id. at 99, 327 A.2d at 61. The superior court had split evenly
on the matter, thus leaving the common pleas court's decision intact. Id. In a lengthy dissenting
opinion to the superior court's per curiam affirmance, Judge Spaulding expressed his conviction
that the law which provided for payment of the enumerated monies only to the wife was viola-
tive of the ERA and should be declared unconstitutional. 224 Pa. Super. Ct. at 182-90, 303
A.2d at 844-48 (Spaulding, J., dissenting).
73. See Pub. L. No. 139, § 1, 1974 Pa. Laws 403 (current version at DIVORCE CODE, supra
note 18, § 502). There is some question as to whether this legislative action was actually neces-
sary in light of the subsequent passage of the Equalization Statute, which might have allowed for
judicial extension of the law's benefits to the excluded class. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2301 (Purdon Supp. 1979); notes 2-4 & 40-47 and accompanying text supra.
74. The supreme court, after discussing the purpose and effect of the ERA, noted that
subsequent to the filing of the appeal under consideration, the legislature had amended the
statute in question to allow for alimony pendente lite and expenses to either spouse. 458 Pa. at
101, 327 A.2d at 62, citing Pub. L. No. 139, §§ 1-2, 1974 Pa. Laws 403 (current version at
DIVORCE CODE, supra note 18, § 502). Responding to that legislative action the court stated:
"The section is obviously adopted to meet the constitutional conflict that existed between the
former section and the new Equal Rights Amendment." 458 Pa. at 102, 327 A.2d at 62. The
trial court's order that the husband pay a security deposit was reversed and the matter was
remanded for reconsideration in light of the amended section. Id.
75. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979). In Orr, an
Alabama statute granting alimony to wives but not to husbands was found to violate the equal
protection clause of the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.
76. See DIVORCE CODE, supra note 18, § 502; note 67 supra.
[ VOL. 25: p. 677
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B. Divorce From Bed and Board
Divorce a mensa et thoro (AMET), or as it is more commonly
known, divorce from bed and board, was a right created by statute
which allowed a wife, and solely a wife, to bring an action to permit
her to live apart from her husband without penalty under certain
specified circumstances. 77 Alimony was available to a wife who had
been granted a divorce AMET. 78  In Weigand, the superior court
considered this apparently discriminatory statute as well, striking it
down as unconstitutional along with the alimony pendente lite stat-
ute.79  The court reasoned that because divorce AMET afforded an
action exclusively to women, it must, therefore, have abridged the
rights of men in Pennsylvania solely on the basis of their sex. 80 Thus,
the court concluded that the statutory provision should "fall in the
light of the [ERA]."81 Like the superior court's holding on alimony
pendente lite in Weigand, however, this finding, too, was reversed
by the supreme court on the same procedural grounds. 82 Similarly, as
with the issue of alimony pendente lite, the supreme court, in revers-
ing, never questioned the superior court's constitutional analysis of
the divorce AMET provision. 83  Therefore, the superior court's
reasoning was thought to be sound, at least until passage of the
Equalization Statute 84 and the supreme court's decision in George v.
George. 85
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (Purdon 1955) (repealed 1980). Unlike divorce a vinculo
matrimonii (divorce from the bonds of matrimony), divorce from bed and board does not sever
the marital union; rather the parties remain husband and wife. However, divorce AMET grants
the parties a legal separation in situations where conditions make it improper or impossible for
them to live together (e.g., cruelty and adultery are grounds for divorce AMET). See id. The
statute in Pennsylvania provided as follows:
Upon complaint, and due proof thereof, it shall be lawful for a wife to obtain a divorce
from bed and board, whenever it shall be judged, in the manner hereinafter provided in
cases of divorce, that her husband has:
(a) Maliciously abandoned his family; or
(b) Maliciously turned her out of doors; or
(c) By cruel and barbarous treatment endangered her life; or
(d) Offered such indignities to her person as to render her condition intolerable and
life burdensome; or
(e) Committed adultery.
Id. This action of divorce originated in ecclesiastical law where absolute divorce was not permit-
ted. A. FREEDMAN & M. FREEDMAN, supra note 67, §§ 352-353. See Corso v. Corso, 120 Pitt.
L.J. 183, 184, 59 Pa. D. & C.2d 546, 548-49 (1972); A. MOMJIAN & N. PERLBERGER,
PENNSYLVANIA FAMILY LAw § 3.5 (1978).
78. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 47 (Purdon 1955) (repealed 1980).
79. See 226 Pa. Super. Ct. at 286, 310 A.2d at 429.
80. Id. at 281-82, 310 A.2d at 428.
81. Id.
82. 461 Pa. at 485, 337 A.2d at 257. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra.
83. See 461 Pa. at 484, 337 A.2d at 257-58; A. MOMJIAN & N. PERLBERGER, supra note 77,
§ 3.5.2.
84. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (Purdon Supp. 1979). See notes 2-4 & 40-47 and ac-
companying text supra.
85. - Pa. -, 409 A.2d 1 (1979).
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In George, instead of finding the divorce AMET statute uncon-
stitutional under the ERA, the supreme court applied the Equaliza-
tion Statute to the law and extended its provisions to cover either
spouse. 8 6 These two developments (the passage of the Equalization
Statute and the supreme court's decision in George) gave new life,
albeit temporary, to this formerly important tool of matrimonial
lawyers. 87 The new Code has repealed the provisions for divorce
from bed and board,8 8 thereby excising this ancient action which
traced its roots to ecclesiastical law. 89 This absolute repeal makes
sense in view of the more liberal provisions for absolute divorce af-
forded by the new Code. 90
C. Choice of the Marital Home
One antiquated aspect of Pennsylvania family law has survived
despite its clear discriminatory nature-i.e., the "choice of the mari-
tal home" doctrine. 91 This doctrine provides that "the choice of the
marital home is the husband's if made in good faith." 92 Therefore, if
a wife refuses to move with her husband, she has failed to comply
with a duty and could be charged with desertion in a divorce ac-
tion. 93
86. Id. at -, 409 A.2d at 3. The George court maintained that passage of the Equaliza-
tion Statute precluded a finding of unconstitutionality and mandated extension. Id.
87. A decree of divorce from bed and board allowed for payment of spousal support or
permanent alimony. See note 78 and accompanying text supra. While the provision would not
permit remarriage, issuance of such a decree did not prevent the spouse from seeking an abso-
lute divorce at a later time. Further, in instituting the suit for absolute divorce, the spouse
could allege the same marital offense which was the basis of the prior divorce from bed and
board. A. FREEDMAN & M. FREEDMAN, supra note 67, § 363. Thus, the divorce AMET pro-
vided a flexible and useful tool with which a practitioner could negotiate.
88. DIVORCE CODE, supra note 18, § 801(a).
89. See A. MOIJIAN & N. PERLBERGER, supra note 77, § 3.5.1; note 77 supra.
90. DIVORCE CODE, supra note 18, § 201. See generally Gold-Bikin & Rounick, supra note
24.
91. See A. MOMJIAN & N. PERLBERGER, supra note 77, § 3.2.7.
92. Santarsiero v. Santarsiero, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 286, 288, 331 A.2d 868, 869 (1974). The
husband may require his wife to move with him if his work, his comfort, or even his conveni-
ence requires it. A. MOMJIAN & N. PERLBERGER, supra note 77, § 3.2.7(b)(2), citing Yohey v.
Yohey, 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 329, 208 A.2d 902 (1965); Fitelson v. Fitelson, 189 Pa. Super. Ct.
366, 150 A.2d 389 (1959).
93. See, e.g., Santarsiero v. Santarsiero, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 286, 288, 331 A.2d 868, 869
(1974); DiMilia v. DiMilia, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 188, 195, 203 A.2d 382, 385 (1964); Sacks v.
Sacks, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 223, 225, 188 A.2d 856, 857 (1963); Pfeiffer v. Pfeiffer, 154 Pa. Super.
Ct. 154, 156, 35 A.2d 551, 552 (1944). But cf. Hrechany v. Hrechany, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 159,
161-62, 191 A.2d 735, 736 (1963) refusal of wife to live in the home of husband's relatives is
not desertion). See generally Perlberger, The Marital Residence-A Strategic Battleground, 81
DIcm. L. REv. 699, 703 (1977).
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While the new Divorce Code has liberalized divorce in Pennsyl-
vania by allowing no-fault actions, some fault grounds have been re-
tained. 94  Therefore, the marital home doctrine could be important
in a case where a wife refuses to move with her husband and will not
consent to a bilateral, "irretrievable breakdown" divorce. 95 In such a
situation, the husband can pursue a divorce -after one year, instead of
three as one of the no-fault provisions would require. 96
It can be argued that the doctrine violates the ERA, and that it
would not be likely to withstand a properly raised challenge. In fact,
in Smith v. Smith, 97 the Pennsylvania Superior Court indicated its
belief that the doctrine would be striken if properly presented before
the court. 98
D. Sumiflary
This brief analysis of the interplay of the ERA and the law of
divorce in Pennsylvania prior to passage of the new Code dem-
onstrates that the Commonwealth's courts have been sensitive to sex
discrimination in this area and have taken af irmative steps to eradi-
cate it. 99 These positive judicial developments were, however, sur-
passed by long-pending but, nevertheless, dramatic legislative action
in the form of passage of the 1980 Divorce Code. 100 The new Code
mandates far-reaching and decisive steps in eliminating sexism.101
However, conspicuous discrimination remains in areas unchanged by
the new law and, as yet, untouched by modern judicial decisions-
areas such as the choice of the marital home doctrine. 10 2  The prac-
titioner should be aware of the potential effectiveness of the ERA as a
tool to excise these final traces of stigmatizing sexual stereotypes
which remain embedded in Pennsylvania laws.
94. DIvoRscE CODE, supra note 18, § 201(a).
95. Id. § 201(c)-(d).
96. Compare id. § 2 01(a)(1) with id. § 201(d).
97. 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 286, 340 A.2d 552 (1975).
98. See id. at 288, 340 A.2d at 553. In Smith, the husband was granted a divorce grounded
on desertion when his wife refused to move with him from Harrisburg to his new pastorate in
Scranton. Id. Although not raised in her brief, at oral argument, the wife raised constitutional
questions of due process and equal protection to challenge the "choice of the marital home"
doctrine. Id. Responding to the wife's constitutional arguments, the court called them "obviously
thought provoking," but found that because she had "totally failed to make any such arguments"
before the oral argument stage, it could not consider them. Id.
99. See notes 66-87 and accompanying text supra.
100. See DIVORCE CODE, supra note 18, §§ 101-802. For a complete analysis of new Code's
provisions and impact, see Gold-Bikin & Rounick, supra note 24.
101. See generally Gold-Bikin & Rounick, supra note 24.
102. See notes 91-98 and accompanying text supra.
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IV. CUSTODY
Because of the Court's concern with the special policy considera-
tions in the area, application of the ERA to child custody law has
been limited and has produced some confusing results. The "tender
years doctrine" represents one such area of controversy. 103 For al-
most two centuries, 10 4 Pennsylvania courts have viewed the natural
mother as the parent better suited to have charge of a child of tender
years. 10 5 The tender years doctrine, although discriminatory on its
face, had been a most persistent presumption in family law. 106 I1
1972, however, the superior court diluted the force of the presump-
tion somewhat, stating that it was "merely the vehicle through which
a decision respecting the infant's custodial well-being may be reached
where factual considerations do not dictate a different result." 107
In Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson,'" a 1977 case, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court criticized the application of the tender
years doctrine even as a procedural vehicle in custody cases, 10 9 ques-
tioning the legitimacy of a presumption predicated upon traditional or
stereotypical roles of men and women in a marital union.110 The
103. See Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binn. 520 (Pa. 1813). The tender years doctrine
created a prima facie rule that the mother was entitled to custody of her natural children of
tender years absent compelling reasons to the contrary. A. MNIOMJIAN & N. PERLBERGER, supra
note 77, § 5.1.1(b)(1).
104. Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binn. 520, 521-22 (Pa. 1813). The court first enunciated
the tender years doctrine in Addicks, holding that a mother, who had been divorced by the
father on grounds of adultery and who had married her paramour in violation of a statute
prohibiting such a marriage during the life of her former husband, should nevertheless retain
custody of her two young children. Id.
105. Id. The Addicks court reasoned: "It is to [the children], that our anxiety is principally
directed; and it appears to us, that considering their tender age, they stand in need of that kind
of assistance, which can be afforded by none so well as a mother." Id. at 521. Two years later,
when the children's ages were thirteen and nine years respectively, the court granted custody
to the father, noting that the children no longer were of the tender ages which require a
mother's attention. Commonwealth v. Addicks, 2 Serg. & Rawl. 174, 175-76 (Pa. 1815). See also
Commonwealth cx rel. Minnick v. Wilson, 159 Pa. Super. Ct. 230, 232, 48 A.2d 27, 28 (1946);
Commonwealth ex rel. Stark v. Stark, 94 Pa. Super. Ct. 86, 88 (1928); Commonwealth ex rel.
Keller v. Keller, 90 Pa. Super. Ct. 357, 359 (1927). See generally Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 262
(1976).
106. Courts had held that the mother's rights to custody of small children would yield only to
compelling reasons. Commonwealth ex rel. Buckner v. Barr, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 124, 126, 95
A.2d 355, 356 (1953); Commonwealth ex rel. Lucchetti v. Lucchetti, 166 Pa. Super. Ct. 530,
531, 72 A.2d 617, 618 (1950).
107. Commonwealth ex rel. Parikh v. Parikh, 449 Pa. 105, 109, 296 A.2d 625, 627 (1972).
Thus, the Parikh court restricted the tender years rule, making it a device applicable only in
those rare cases where either parent could serve the child's best interests equally well,
and where no other factors were present. Id. See also Commonwealth cx rel. Veihdeffer v.
Veihdeffer, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 447, 449, 344 A.2d 613, 614 (1975); Commonwealth ex rel.
Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 229, 236, 312 A.2d 58, 62 (1973).
108. 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977).
109. Id. at 299-300, 368 A.2d at 639-40.
110. Id. at 299, 368 A.2d at 639.
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court cautioned against uncritical application of the tender years doc-
trine and found it offensive to the Commonwealth's constitutionally
mandated policy of equality of the sexes."' The opinion in Spriggs
on this point, however, received the approval of only three jus-
tices, 112 thus reducing its precedential value.
In 1978, the superior court again discussed the tender years doc-
trine in Sykora v. Sykora, 113 indicating that it gave the rule greater
weight than the supreme court had given it in Spriggs. 114 Neverthe-
less, the Sykora court acknowledged that the Spriggs decision had
"tempered" the doctrine to some degree. 115
While not in direct conflict, Spriggs 116 and Sykora 117 indicate
some lack of harmony in applying the spirit, if not the letter, of the
ERA to the area of child custody. In view of this dissonance, it seems
clear that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will have to deal more
definitively with the tender years doctrine in the near future.
V. PROPERTY RIGHTS
In the area of property rights, the ERA has helped to eliminate
two outdated common law presumptions -one dealing with house-
hold goods purchased during the marriage, 118 and the other with gifts
between spouses.
In DiFlorido v. DiFlorido,120 the supreme court considered the
issue of ownership after divorce of household goods acquired im-
mediately prior to or during marriage which were used and possessed
by both spouses during the union.121 The common law raised a pre-
111. Id. at 300, 368 A.2d at 639-40.
112. Id. at 290, 300, 368 A.2d at 636, 640. Justice Nix wrote the opinion of the court in
which Justices Roberts and O'Brien joined. Chief Justice Jones, along with Justices Eagan and
Pomeroy, concurred in the result, with Justice Mandarino not participating in the consideration
or decision. Id. Although the court based its holding on the superior court's abuse of discretion
with respect to findings of fact, it also expressed dissatisfaction with the lower court's application
of the tender years doctrine. Id. at 298-300, 368 A.2d at 639.
113. Sykora v. Sykora, 259 Pa. Super. Ct. 400, 402, 393 A.2d 888, 889 (1978).
114. Id. at 403, 393 A.2d at 888-89. See notes 108-13 and accompanying text supra.
115. 259 Pa. Super. Ct. at 403, 393 A.2d at 888-89. The Sykora court stated that "generally
children should be raised together, and children of tender years should be with the mother.
However, both rules are not absolute, and must yield to the paramount principle that the best
interest of each individual child must be the determining factor." Id. (emphasis added). The
court reconciled the Spriggs decision by interpreting it as merely a limit on the strength of the
presumption of the tender years doctrine, leaving intact the use of tender years as one consider-
ation in determining what serves the best interests of the child. Id. at 403, 393 A.2d at 889.
116. 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977).
117. 259 Pa. Super. Ct. 400, 393 A.2d 888 (1978).
118. See notes 120-23 and accompanying text infra.
119. See notes 124-29 and accompanying text infra.
120. 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d 174 (1975).
121. Id. at 645, 331 A.2d at 176.
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sumption that household furnishings, in the possession of a husband
and wife living together, were owned by the husband. 122  Finding
such a presumption to be in derogation of the ERA, the DiFlorido
court stated that since the law could not impose different burdens nor
award different benefits purely on the basis of sex, the court must
"unhesitatingly disregard the one-sided presumption" which had been
imposed under Pennsylvania common law. 123
Similarly, in Butler v. Butler, 124 the supreme court held that
passage of the ERA voided the one-sided presumptions that had
existed at common law regarding gifts. 125 Under the common law as
applied in Pennsylvania, when a husband purchased real or personal
property with his own money and put such property in his wife's
name or into an estate by the entireties, his actions created a pre-
sumption of a gift to the wife. 126  The dichotomy arose because the
wife's similar actions in paying for real or personal property and put-
ting it in her husband's name or into an entireties estate gave rise to
a rebuttable presumption that a trust was created in her favor, and
that there was no gift to the husband. 127 Responding to the obvious
sexual bias inherent in this doctrine, the Butler court created a uni-
form presumption that anytime either husband or wife contributes to
the purchase of an item held by the entireties, such contribution is
presumed to be a gift to the other spouse. 128 Such a presumption is
122. Id. at 648, 331 A.2d at 178. See also In re Estate of Mulligan, 426 Pa. 374, 376, 232
A.2d 758, 759 (1967); In re King Estate, 387 Pa. 119, 127, 126 A.2d 463, 467 (1956); Dura Seal
Prods. Co. v. Carver, 186 Pa. Super. Ct. 425, 426, 140 A.2d 844, 845 (1958); In re Schwartz'
Estate, 166 Pa. Super. Ct. 459, 462, 71 A.2d 831, 833 (1950); A. MOMJIAN & N. PERLBERGER,
supra note 77, § 8.1.4(b). Such a presumption could be overcome by a showing that the wife
paid for the household goods, inherited them, acquired them by gift, or that they were paid for
jointly by husband and wife. Id., citing In re King Estate, 387 Pa. 119, 126 A.2d 463 (1956);
Dura Seal Prods. Co. v. Carver, 186 Pa. Super. Ct. 425, 140 A.2d 844 (1958).
123. 459 Pa. at 650-51, 331 A.2d at 179 (citations omitted). The DiFlorido court also noted
that the presumption originated in the marriage entity concept which considered the husband
and wife to be one entity. Id. at 648-49, 331 A.2d at 178-79. Since this concept was abrogated
by the Married Woman's Property Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 32.1 (Purdon 1978), the court
found that a presumption favoring the husband had no current justification. 459 Pa. at 648-49,
331 A.2d at 178-79. For an earlier decision which reached the same conclusion, see Fine v.
Fine, 366 Pa. 227, 228-29, 77 A.2d 436, 436-37 (1951.).
124. 464 Pa. 522, 347 A.2d 477 (1975).
125. Id. at 527-28, 347 A.2d at 480.
126. Such a presumption could be overcome only by clear, unequivocal evidence to the con-
trary. See Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 129, 224 A.2d 164, 169 (1966); Lapayowker v.
Lincoln College Preparatory School, 386 Pa. 167, 171-72, 125 A.2d 451, 454 (1956); Katz v.
Katz, 309 Pa. 115, 120, 163 A. 214, 216 (1932); Cassner v. Cassner, 280 Pa. 313, 317, 124 A.
483, 484-85 (1924).
127. The presumption was rebuttable by an affirmative showing that the husband acted in
good faith and took no undue advantage of his wife. Clay v. Keiser, 460 Pa. 620, 628-29, 334
A.2d 263, 267 (1975); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 129, 224 A.2d 164, 169 (1966); DeBer-
nard v. DeBernard, 384 Pa. 194, 196-97, 120 A.2d 176, 177-78 (1956).
128. 464 Pa. at 527-28, 347 A.2d at 481.
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rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence that the gift was
induced by fraud or duress.129
Pennsylvania's 1980 Divorce Code has incorporated the modern
approach to property rights set forth in DiFlorido and Butler into its
provisions for equitable distribution. 130 Under the Code, marital
property131 is to be equitably divided between spouses, taking into
account virtually any relevant factors, including a number specifically
set out in the statute. 132 Notably, the new Code materially recog-
nizes the contribution made by a homemaker-spouse when it provides
for division of the marital property. 133 It also makes allowance for a
certain degree of economic dependence by the homemaker-spouse
upon dissolution of the marriage.134
In providing for alimony after absolute divorce, 135 the new Code
again reflects the philosophy of the ERA by allowing for the financial
support of either spouse who is unable to maintain himself or herself
following dissolution of the marriage. 136 Essentially rehabilitative in
nature,' 7 the alimony provisions of the Code recognize such factors
as duration of marriage, 138 contribution by one spouse to the educa-
tion or increased earning power of the other,' 3 9 and contribution of
the homemaker-spouse 140 in determining the award.
129. Id. In Butler, the wife requested that a constructive trust be imposed upon funds which
she, at her husband's suggestion, had contributed to a joint account. id. at 525, 347 A.2d at
479. Funds from this account were used to buy real property. Id. The court refused to impose
the trust, finding that the wife, who had handled the family finances, must have been knowl-
edgeable about the transactions and could not have been the victim of fraud or duress as is
necessary for the imposition of a constructive trust. Id. at 529-30, 347 A.2d at 481. See also
Yohe v. Yohe, 466 Pa. 405, 411, 353 A.2d 417, 420 (1976).
130. DIVORCE CODE, supra note 18, §§ 401(d)-(j), 402.
131. The Code defines marital property as "all property acquired by either party during
marriage," with seven specific areas of exception. Id. § 401(e).
132. Id. § 401(d). The Statute specifies such factors as the length of the marriage; age,
health, socio-economic station, amount and source of income, vocational skills, employability,
estate, liabilities, and needs of the parties; contribution by one party to the education, training,
or increased earning power of the other; sources of income of each party; contribution of each
party to the acquisition or dissipation of marital property, including contribution as a
homemaker; the standard of living established during marriage; the economic circumstances of
each party at the time the property division becomes effective. Id. The list is illustrative, not
exhaustive, and additional factors will surely be added as family law litigators apply creative
imaginations to the implementation of the new Code. Id.133. Id. §401(d)(7).
134. Id. § 401(d)(3), (10).
135. Id. §§ 501, 503, 504.
136. Id. § 501.
137. See id. § 501(c). The Code provides for a limitation to be placed on the duration of
alimony payments. Id. By its provisions, the statute appears designed to allow the spouse to
develop employability or to survive a period when employment is impossible, such as during
the nurturing of young children. See id. § 501(b), (c).
138. Id. § 501(b)(5).
139. Id. § 501(b)(6).
140. Id. § 501(b)(12).
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It appears, then, that the combined effect of the ERA and the
new Divorce Code has brought marital property rights in Pennsyl-
vania into harmony with the modern understanding of sex roles in
society.
VI. OTHER AREAS
Passage of the ERA has significantly affected related areas of law
as well. In tort actions, for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has held that the ERA requires wives, as well as husbands, to have
the right to recover for loss of consortium, 141 a remedy traditionally
reserved for the male. 142 In Hopkins v. Blanco, 143 the court
explained: "Today a husband and wife are equal partners in a marital
relationship, and as such, should be treated equally under the
law." 144
In another case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court judicially man-
dated equality in the application of the old criminal "neglect to sup-
port a bastard" statute. 4 5 The court found that, although it was cast
in the male gender and referred to the father, the old law encom-
passed both mother and father and, so applied, was not repugnant to
the ERA. 146  It should be noted that the same result would have
been achieved by application of the Equalization Statute. 147
Finally, another statute which seems ripe for an ERA challenge
is the act relating to debts incurred for "necessaries." 148 The law is
definitely discriminatory on its face, allowing a creditor to obtain
execution against a husband alone to satisfy a judgment obtained on a
debt contracted in purchasing "necessaries for the maintenance of the
family of any married woman." 149 Again, however, application of the
Equalization Statute 150 would save the provision.
141. Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 93, 320 A.2d 139, 141 (1974). In Hopkins, a wife
brought a separate action for loss of consortium against her husband's doctors whose alleged mal-
practice had resulted in his incapacitation. Id. at 91, 320 A.2d at 140.
142. See Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 158, 162 A.2d 662, 667 (1960).
143. 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974).
144. Id. at 93, 320 A.2d at 141.
145. Commonwealth v. Baggs, 258 Pa. Super. Ct. 133, 392 A.2d 720 (1978). See 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 4323 (1973) (repealed 1978).
146. Commonwealth v. Baggs, 258 Pa. Super. Ct. 133, 137-38, 392 A.2d 720, 721 (1978). The
Baggs court relied upon a Pennsylvania statute which provides, as a rule of statutory construc-
tion, that "words used in the masculine gender shall include the feminine and neuter." Id. at
136, 392 A.2d at 721, quoting 1 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 1902 (1978). The word "he" in the criminal
support statute was held by Baggs to include both feminine and neuter genders when construed
with the word "parent." 258 Pa. Super. Ct. at 137-38, 392 A.2d at 721.
147. See I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (Purdon Supp. 1979); notes 2-4 and accompanying
text supra.
148. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 116 (Purdon 1965).
149. Id.
150. See I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (Purdon Supp. 1979); notes 2-4 and accompanying
text supra.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In less than a decade, Pennsylvania's equal rights amendment
has had a remarkable impact on the status of family law within the
Commonwealth. The constitutional mandate has been applied suc-
cessfully to eliminate various unfounded sexual stereotypes that had
been perpetuated in legislation and common law doctrines.
Initial fears that the ERA would destroy the family unit and
would prove unduly harsh to either spouse have been shown to be
unwarranted. 15 1 Indeed, the ERA has generally been applied by the
courts with admirable evenhandedness 152 and with extraordinary sen-
sitivity to the special problems inherent in the family law context. 153
Thus, the ERA is working effectively-both through its application
by the courts, and through its inspiration to the legislature-to
eliminate institutionalized sexual discrimination and to bring archaic
doctrines into harmony with the more modern understanding of sex-
ual roles.
151. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
152. See notes 13-35, 40-46, 66-102, 118-29 & 141-46 and accompanying text supra.
153. See notes 103-15 and accompanying text supra.
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